What I'm working on: A Wittgensteinian way to dissolve the mind/body problem (esp. the problem of overcausation in the mental causation of physical events) with a double aspect theory that works as a linguistic parallelism.
Claim: That the mind/body problem are resulting from confusion because we have two languages, neither of which describes the world totally. Attempting to explain/describe the world fully, we go back and forth between languages, creating this confusion. Thus, some questions are answered with one language and others with another, leading to confusion in traditional dualist and materialist talk of causation, etc. E.g., Mathematical and phenomenological descriptions of a screw.
Double aspect theory: the mental and the physical are two aspects of the same thing, irreducible to each other.
Linguistic parallelism: My name for my attempt at incorporating the linguistic functionalism (of Sellars, Quine and esp. Wittgenstein) into the mind/body debate. I think I want a parallelism in that the physical and mental always keep pace/run parallel without interacting, but argue the distinction between mind and body is a linguistic one.
(So far as I know, this is not a developed/established philosophical theory. The closest thing might be Spinoza.)